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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. L. ROMNEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
COVEY GARAGE, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case
No. 6243

AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,
Interpleaded Defendant and
Respondent
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, COVEY GARAGE

Plaintiff's counsel have filed a well and cleverly
prepared brief, which on first examination might appear
to justify the desired conclusion. A more careful examination makes perfectly apparent that the real and determinative factors have been begged.
Respondent not only assumes that the evidence
discloses negligence, but adds to that assumption, an
additional assumption that the thief, Freeman, gained
entrance as a result of such negligence, or in other words,
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
theft and resulting accident. In other words, respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

endeavors to recover on one assumption based upon another assumption, or one conjecture predicated upon
another conjecture. This court has recognized and adhered to the rule that a judgment cannot be based upon
conjectures upon conjectures or inferences upon inferences. In Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15,
4?' Pac. (2d) 1054, it was said:
"The only things to rebut their testimony
are the inferences heretofore discussed that counsel would have us draw."
Again the court says:

"It is inference based on inference, in series
and in reverse."
Exactly the same argument is applicable to respondent's
argument. He argues that although plaintiff's evidence
does not definitely show negligence, yet by reading between the lines, an inference of negligence can be found.
Certainly there is no more than such a possible inference. He next argues that while there is no evidence
that Freeman gained entrance to the garage as a result
of such inferred negligence, yet an inference may be
drawn that he did so gain entrance. In other words,
it is necessary in order to sustain the judgment to first
infer negligence, and then on that inference, base an·
other inference that the proximate cause or actual entrance resulted from the first inference of negligence.
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It is a clear case of inference upon inference, with a
total absence of positive evidence.
Respondent completely ignores fundamental rules.
He admits that there is no affirmative evidence of negligence, and likewise admits that he has only shown possible or probable ways by which Freeman could have
gained entrance. He says he has shown "a number of
PROBABLE ways in which the thieves could have entered." He then says, "On this, as well as other
THEORIES of the facts, plaintiff made a prima facie
case." In other words, his position is one merely of "prob·
ability" or "theories" or "inferences." He entirely overlooks the necessity that the "inferences" or "probabilities"
must all lead in one direction and exclude other hypotheses. He overlooks the necessity for the evidence to
do more than raise a conjecture or probability. This
court in Tremelling v. Southern Pacific, 70 Utah 72, 257
Pac. 1066, said:
"The evidence must, however, do more than
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability
as to the cause of the injury, and no recovery
can be had if the evidence leaves it to conjecture
which of two causes resulted in the injury, where
defendant was liable for only one of them."
Certainly, as hereafter pointed out, the evidence
does not exclude reasonable hypotheses under which no
liability would attach. Not only is there a total failure
in sueh respect, but rather does the evidence show affirmSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

b

atively an exercise of reasonable and ordinary care b)
the defendant, and a gaining of entrance by an experi·
enced thief through some trick or device which ordinary
care would not guard against.
At page nine of his brief, respondent conclude~
that "if reasonable minds could differ as to whether
defendant was negligent, the judgment of the trial court
must be sustained." This statement would be true if, as
we have pointed out, there was first, affirmative evidence of negligence, and, second, evidence that such
negligence was the proximate cause of Freeman's entrance and the resulting loss. Respondent again overlooks
the basic rules of liability at page seventeen, in saying:
"If this court decides * * ~~ that reasonable minds might
differ as to whether or not defendant exercised reasonable care for the protection of plaintiff's automobile, the
judgment below must be affirmed." This argument, and
in fact all arguments advanced in respondent's brief,
consistently and cleverly assume as established the very
facts, the absence of which sustain a successful defense
against liability. The fundamental essentials of a cause
of action, to-wit: evidence of negligence and evidence of
proximate cause, are ignored.
Counsel endeavor to show from the evidence how
the burglars in this case may have found entrance tc
the building. The most that can be said of his possibl~
theory is that they might have gained entrance by sud
method, but it is equally as possible or probable tha1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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entrance was not gained by any means suggested, but
rather while all the lights of the city were out, or by
hiding in the back of an automobile taken into the
garage. There is absolutely no evidence as to the actual
means of entry. How then, could it be said defendant's
negligence caused the loss? Even if it be assumed (without proof} that defendant was negligent in not making
certain the door to the wash rack was closed, how could
it be said that such was the proximate cause of the loss,
if Freeman entered when the lights of the city were
out, and no one could see, or if he road in in the back of
a car.
A case based on negligence and proximate cause
necessarily fails when all that is shown is a mere possibility.
NO PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

The only doors to the garage other than the front
entrance were the two doors, one on the north side of the
garage, and the other on the south side between the,
garage proper and another place of business. The latter
was always kept locked with a padlock on the garage
side, and a partition separated the places of business.
No one could get in this door without first getting into
the garage. (Tr. 2? -28, 45) As to the door on the north side,
respondent's counsel asked the witness Remington, "Do
you know whether or not that door was closed on the
evening of April 30, 1938, between ten and eleven-thirty.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"A. It was closed between ten and eleven, or after ten
it was closed and locked." He did not recall that he had
personally checked it that particular evening. (Tr. 27).
As to the doors in the front of the garage, the
opening at the extreme left, looking at plaintiff's Exhibit "A," is a little sort of room that has a door in the
back, but it is always kept locked and that is not used
as an exit or entrance. (Tr. 68). The opening shown in the
picture next to this room is the laundry or wash rack.
The laundry closes at six o'clock. (Tr. 24). There are
doors that close in front of the wash rack. (Tr. 25). The
wash rack door is usually closed. (Tr. 32). He did. not
know definitely whether or not the doors were closed
between ten and eleven-thirty on the evening of April
30, 1938. The other two entrances seen on the picture
on either side of the gas pumps are used for driving
cars in and out of the garage. The entire front
of the garage is plainly visible from the office. THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE ANY DOORS WERE UNLOCKED OR THAT
ANY EMPLOYEE FAILED IN HIS DUTY.

Respondent's brief, page six, suggests "that the
thieves were able to use the cars parked at the south
end of the service platform as a screen to shield their
entrance by means of the wash rack door." Simply another possibility. Plaintiff's witness testified that the
laundry closed at six o'clock p. m., and the wash rack
is usually closed. It is pure speculation that the wash
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rack door was not closed. It is pure speculation that the
thieves entered through the wash rack. It is pure speculation that even if they did enter through the wash
rack, that the defendant was negligent, and certainly
it is purely a guess that if defendant failed t(> exercise
reasonable and ordinary care in any particulc.. r respect
that the loss proximately resulted from such failure. The
most that could be said for plaintiff's evidence is that
Freeman might or possibly could have gained entrance
through the wash rack. Negligence and proximate cause
cannot be proved by merely showing what might have
happened-mere possibilities.
In our original brief, we cited general authority and
many cases holding that the presumption arising in favor
of plaintiff, based on proof of bailment and failure to
return on demand, is completely overcome upon undisputed proof produced by either party that the bailed
article was stolen or destroyed by fire. These cases are
based upon the well-founded theory that the presumption is merely a rule of orderly procedure requiring the
bailee to go forward with the evidence in explanation
of the loss, as distinguished from the burden of proof,
which remains with plaintiff throughout. Respondent
does not disagree with this rule and acknowledges his
obligation to prove liability. This presumption is based
purely on proof of the bailment and failure to return
upon demand, and as neither the bailment, nor failure
to return are in and of themselves actual evidence of
neglip;ence, or any evidence as to whether or not the loss
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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actually occurred with or without the fault of the bailee,
such presumption entirely disappears in the face of
actual evidence. This represents the weight of authority
and is the view taken by this court as last announced
in Saltas v. Affleck, (Utah} 102 Pac. (2d) 493:
"And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that as soon as evidence is offered on the question, the presumption ceases and does not longer
exist. In Re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 468, 5 Pac.
(2d} 230, State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2d)
177, Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 Pac. (2d)
1049, 109 A. L. R. 105."
The fact that North Carolina goes a step further
than the general rule and requires the bailee to rebut
the presumption by more than proof of the bare fact
of theft, makes all the more significant, the decision of
Swain v. Twin City Motor Company, 178 S. E. 560 (Appellant's brief pp. 27-30, Respondent's brief pp. 19-21).
In the instant case, there was the additional proof that
the defendant's garage was operated in accordance with
the same standards and customs of similar garages
throughout the country, which method of operation was
well-known to the plaintiff.
Minnesota and Pennsylvania are alone in holding
that the ultimate burden of proof is on the defendant
or bailee to establish that it exercised due care. In
Harding v. Shapiro (Minn.), 206 N. W. 168 (Respondent's
brief p. 11}, it is said:
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"The burden was upon defendant to prove
that the loss of the property bailed with him was
not the result of his negligence. * * * It was not for
him merely to go forward with the evidence, but
he had the burden of proving to the jury that the
loss did not come from his negligence."
And in Trendt v. Sley System Garages, 188 Atl.
624 (Respondent's brief p. 13), the Pennsylvania court
says:

"If a bailee fails to give a satisfactory explanation for its disappearance, he has the burden
of proving that the loss was not due to his negligence."
These two states are obviously against the decided
weight of authority. Respondent himself does not claim
the burden of proof is on the defendant, but states at
page seventeen:
"Appellant takes the position that the ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Since the
plaintiff assumed and discharged the burden of
proving negligence, this question is of no importance upon appeal. The only question before this
court is whether or not the judgment finds support
in the testimony."
We can agree with counsel In his statement that
the question on this appeal should be decided upon
"whether or not the judgment finds support in the testimony," that is in the evidence. That being the case,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the fact that the ultimate burden of proof of establishing
negligence is upon the plaintiff is of no importance on
this appeal, except that if there is not sufficient actual
evidence to sustain a finding of both specific negligence
and proximate cause, plaintiff's case must fail; whereas,
if the ultimate burden of proof were on the defendant
to prove he was not negligent, then a finding in favor
of plaintiff in a case of this kind might be perfectly
proper, even though there was no evidence of negligence,
just the same as a defendant, who being sued for damages arising out of an automobile accident would be
entitled to a judgment in his favor if the plaintiff, who
in that case had the ultimate burden of proof, failed
to prove negligence and proximate cause.
True, it is not the province of the appellate court
to determine where the weight of the evidence is, but
it is the province of such court to determine if there is
any actual substantial evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of negligence and proximate cause. We maintain
on this appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a finding that defendant was negligent, and also insufficient to sustain a finding of proximate cause. On the contrary it is established that defendant exercised that
reasonable care usually exercised by all garages. The
evidence must do more than show that the defendant
might have been negligent, or if negligent, that the loss
might have been caused by such negligence. As stated
in Fritz v. Electric Light Company, 18 Utah 493, 56 Pac.
90 (Appellants brief pp. 36-37), "to entitle the plaintiffs
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to recover, it was incumbent upon them to establish the
negligence of defendant by some evidence, and that
such negligence was either the cause of, or contributed to
the accident. Negligence cannot be presumed, nor the
question thereof left to conjecture."
This is particularly true when a case is based on
circumstantial evidence. ]ones on Evidence, Civ. Cases,
4th Ed. Vol. 3. Sec. 899, p. 1681, says:
"A theory cannot be said to be established by
circumstantial evidence, either in a civil action or
in a criminal prosecution unless the disclosed facts
and circumstances shown are consistent therewith
and inconsistent with any other rational theory."

Cornwell v. O'Connor (Kan.), 5 Pac. (2d) 861:
"The appellee relies upon circumstances toprove negligence. To accomplish this the facts
and conditions must be of such significance and
relation one to the other that a reasonable conclusion of negligence can be founded thereon. To
establish a theory by circumstances the facts
relied on must be of such a nature and so related
one to the other that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom is the theory sought
to be established."

Simpson v. Hillman (Ore.), 9? Pac. (2d) 52?:

"It is well established that the causal connection between defendant's act or omission and
the injury must not be left to surmise or conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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jecture. The evidence must be something more
substantial than merely indicating a possibility
that the alleged negligence of the defendant was
the proximate cause of the injury. When the evidence shows two or more equally probable causes
of injury, for not all of which the defendant is
responsible, no action for negligence can he maintained. In other words, negligence can not he
based on conjecture or speculation."
In Potter v. Dr. W. H. Groves L. D. S. Hospital
(Utah), 103 Pac. (2d) 280, wherein this court held that
plaintiff had failed to prove that the hospital was negligent in not placing sideboards on a bed, it was said:
"There is nothing to show that in not attaching sideboards to Mrs. Potter's bed, appellant was
not exercising due care prior to and at the time
of her injury. Some negligent act or failure to
act by the hospital or its servants must be alleged
and proved. Plaintiffs (respondents) did not establish that a standard of due care required the
hospital to place sideboards on the bed of patients
in the condition of Mrs. Potter on Monday night.
Therefore, its failure to place sideboards on Mrs.
Potter's bed that night was not negligence."
In that case, the accident might not have happened had
they had sideboards on the bed. In the instant case in
what respect it could be said defendant was negligent,
much less appears than in the Potter case, because absolutely nothing is shown which defendant should have
been required to do in the exercise of ordinary care that
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would have prevented the theft. Even an armed guard or
a special watchman, which in the Swain case, supra, was
not required, would not have prevented Freeman and his
companion from slipping in while the city was in dark·
ness or by hiding in the back of an automobile. As the
California court said in Perera v. Panama-Pacific International E.'-·position Co., 1?5 Pac. 454 (Appellant's brief
pp. 31-32):
"We find in the evidence no sufficient gauge
by '"~hich it may fairly be concluded that the
* * * protection so furnished was not reasonably
adequate; that is, that it was less than a reasonable man, in view of all the circumstances, would
deem essential to * * '~: proper protection."
RESPONDENT'S CASES

To support his argument, counsel cites cases from
Minnesota and Pennsylvania where, as we have pointed
out, contrary to the great weight of authority, the ultimate burden is on defendant to prove he was not negligent. These cases have no application, because in those
states, even if there was no evidence of negligence, a
finding of negligence would be justified. "Since the
plaintiff" in the instant case "assumed" and claimed
to have "discharged the burden of proving negligence"
(Respondent's brief p. 1?), these cases are of no importance on this appeal. Many of the cases cited by respondent had to do with garages closed and supposedly locked
for the night, rather than a garage open for business.
Others have to do with vacant lots, which were used for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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parking cars. None of the cases, we submit, are in point,
because they either come from a state where the ultimate burden of proof rests on defendant, or are based
solely on the so-called presumption rule, or are cases
where specific negligence was found in the evidence.

Rogers v. Murch, 149 N. E. 202 (Respondent's brief
p. 9), had' to do with a garage left unattended for the
night. There was no watchman, and plaintiff alleged and
proved that the entrance to the building was effected
through a window in the basement.
In Harding v. Shapiro (Minn.), 206 N. W. 168 (Respondent's brief p. 11), the means of entry was established, and the garage had been closed, with no attendants or watchmen on duty. Furthermore, the case
coming from Minnesota, rests upon the rule there that
defendant had the burden of proving he was not negligent.
The Baione v. Heavey decision (Pa.), 158 Atl. 181
(Respondent's brief p. 12), likewise comes from a jurisdiction where the burden of proof is on defendant. In the
opinion it is not stated what the evidence was, hut it
does appear that there was an outside parking lot which
was unfenced, and that the cars in leaving were not
required to go out any particular exit and might cross
the sidewalk at any place along two streets.

Wendt v. Sley System Garages, 188 Atl. 624 (Respondent's brief p. 13), likewise comes from PennsylSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
vania. There were only two attendants, when customarily
at least four were provided. The quotation from 6 C. ].
1158, Section 160, quoted from the Wendt case, and also
appearing at page 21 of respondent's brief, is incomplete.
"'e quote further from this citation at page 1160:
"But by the weight of authority the rule does
not go so far as to require the bailee positively
to acquit himself of negligence. The burden of
proof of showing negligence is on the bailor
and remains on him throughout the trial. The
presumption arising from injury to the goods or
failure to redeliver is sufficient to satisfy this burden and make out a prima facie case against the
bailee; but the bailee may overcome this presumption by showing that the loss occurred
through some cause consistent with due care on
his part, in which case he is entitled to the verdict
unless the bailor affirmatively proves to the satisfaction of the jury that the loss would not have
occurred but for the negligence of the bailee.
Thus if he proves that the loss was occasioned by
burglary or theft, by fire, by the falling of the
warehouse in which the goods were stored, or
by any inevitable accident, the burden is again
shifted to the bailor to prove defendant's negligence."
In the instant case, there never was a presumption,
because it affirmatively appeared without dispute and
from plaintiff's complaint that the car had been stolen.
Plaintiff based his action upon negligence and not upon
any contract of bailment, introduced evidence and
i.!.'islt1n(>d the obligation and claimed to have discharged
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the burden of proving negligence. In face of the pleadings and evidence, no presumption existed.

Byalos v. Matheson, 159 N. E. 242 (Respondent's
brief p. 15), rests entirely on the presumption. Plaintiff's
action in4hat case was not based on negligence, nor did
the plaintiff undertake to prove negligence, and "no
proof was offered by the appellant (defendant) that he
was not guilty of negligence."
\

In Medes v. Hornbach, 6 Fed. (2d) ?11 (Respondent's brief p. 16), the automobile was taken out by one
of the employees of defendant without the consent of
the owner.
We cannot see how the case of Travelers Fire Insurance Co. v. Brock and Co., 85 Pac. (2d) 904 (Respondent's brief p. 22), has any application, when in that state
"the answer to the question on whom is the burden of
proof as to defendant's negligence, depends on the pleadings." U Drive & Tour, Ltd., v. System Auto Parks, Ltd.,
(Cal. Super.) ?1 Pac. (2d) 354, 356. In the Travelers case,
the action was "based on contract." ln the instant case,
plaintiff not only based his complaint on negligence but
at the trial "assumed

***

the burden of proving neg-

ligence."
In Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, 293 Pac.
821 (Respondent's brief p. 23), "the defendant's attendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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left its parking place without taking the slightest precaution to protect plaintiff's car against theft."

Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funk, 177 N. E. 364 (Respondent's brief p. 25), is a case apparently based on the presumption, but the fact also appears that the bailor's
wife asked that she be permitted to lock the car and
take the keys with her. This request was refused.
Hoel v. Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co., 175 N. W.
300 (Respondent's brief p. 26), is another Minnesota case.
Federal Insurance Co. v. Lindsley, 228 N. Y. S. 614, was
an action apparently based on contract.
In Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188
Pac. 856, there was substantial evidence that "the manager informed the porters that they had been careless,
and promised plaintiff's husband that the matter would
be fixed up if the grip could not be found." The finding
of negligence was justified by the admission.
In General Exchange Insurance Corporation v. Service Parking Grounds, Inc., 235 N. W. 898 (Respondent's
brief pp. 28-29) there was specific negligence:
"Not only was the car taken without the
surrender of the tickets, but it was further shown
that there were no lights on the lot at night time;
that the lot was enclosed by barriers, but it had
two exits and entrances which were not guarded."
The cases cited (Respondent's brief pp. 31-32), were
cases where there were no attendants both day and night
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and hoarders, lodgers, guests, and all were permitted free
access to the garage. One of those cases, Employers Fire

Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Garage, 155 N. E. 533, had to do
with a theft by one of defendant's employees.
Respondent limits the question on this appeal to
"whether or not the evidence supports the judgment."
(Respondent's brief p. 31.) Negligence and proximate
cause cannot, we submit, he sustained by the evidence.
There can he no presumption in the instant case, because plaintiff did not base his complaint upon contract
or upon the presumption, hut both undertook to allege
and prove negligence and "assumed and" claimed to
have "discharged the burden of proving negligence."
The bailment and failure to return upon demand, the
facts upon which any so-called presumption rests, are
not in and of themselves any evidence of negligence, and
when actual evidence was introduced, any possible presumption wholly disappeared. The actual evidence at
most shows nothing hut possible ways of gaining entrance to the garage. The evidence is undisputed that the
garage was being operated in accordance with the same
standards and practices as other garages throughout the
country, and this was known to plaintiff. There was no
evidence that an established standard of due care was
not maintained by the garage and its employees. The
manner of entrance of the burglars is wholly unknown.
It is just as probable they entered while the city was in
darkness or by hiding in the hack of an automobile, or
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by some other means. There is no fact shown which under

the evidence can be said to be the basis of negligence on
the part of the defendant. Nor is there any evidence by
which it can possibly be determined that such fact, if
its existance were supported by evidence, had even a
remote connection with the real or actual cause of the
theft. Even if it should be assumed that defendant was
negligent in any manner which respondent suggests,
it cannot be said that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the theft, if the thieves entered by some other
means.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
court are insufficient to sustain the judgment for the
same reasons. The court did not find the defendant negligent in any particular.
DEFENDANT'S

DE~1URRER

Jlangum v. Bullion, Etc., JIJining Co., 15 Utah 534, 50
Pac. 834, and Eddington v. Cement Co., 42 Utah 274, 130
Pac. 243 (Respondent's brief 34-35), had to do with a general demurrer or an ob,jection to the complaint on appeal
not made in the trial court. In the "A1 an gum case, it was
said:
"If the facts were not stated with certaintv
and definiteness which good pleading requires, th~
appellant's remedy was by special demurrer or
motion to make more definite and certain."
In the instant case, defendant's general demurrer was
based upon the fact that the cause of the loss affirmaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tively appeared, namely, the theft. The purpose of the
motion in Schaff v. Coyle (Okla.), 249 Pac. 94? (Respondent's brief p. 36), is not disclosed in the opinion. Respondent claims that all facts were within the knowledge
and possession of the defendant, yet it appears that the
employees of the garage themselves did not know how
the thieves got in the garage. If respondent claims defendant was negligent in parking the automobile south of
the wash rack, certainly he could have alleged the same
in his complaint. We submit that defendant's demurrer
should have been sustained when actual negligence rather
than a presumption is relied on.
CLAIM OF AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSURANCE COMPANY

It was our understanding (Tr.35) that respondent
stipulated that the American Equitable Assurance Company paid to Mr. Romney, the plaintiff, under a collision
coverage policy, the amount of his loss under the policy,
subject to counsel's objection that it was immaterial;
otherwise, defendant would have produced actual evidence to that effect. True, the court did not pass on the
materiality of the matter, hut, nevertheless, it was the
duty of the court to make its findings in accordance with
the evidence. In the Potomac case, the plaintiff was protected because the insurance company had paid the entire loss and there had been an assignment, at least by
subrogation of the entire loss. In the instant case, there
was subrogation of a part of the loss, and defendant is
entitled to he protected against the insurance company
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as to the portion paid by it. To properly do this, the
court should have divided the recovery, if any, between
Mr. Romney and the insurance company, proportionate
to the loss sustained by each.
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS SQUIRES

In the cases cited by respondent, notice to the defendant of a prior accident or event was held to be material in putting the defendant on notice of some defective
condition of the sidewalk or premises of the defendant,
which after such notice could have been remedied. In
Hurd v. U. P. Ry. Co., 8 Utah 241, 30 Pac. 982 (Respondent's brief p 39) the sidewalk had been left Ill an unguarded and dangerous condition.
In McCormick v. Great Western Power Co., 8 Pac.
(2d) 145 (Respondent's brief p. 39), it is pointed out
that electricity is a "dangerous instrumentality" and
one who maintains it must exercise a high degree of care,
and has a definite duty to keep the wires properly insulated or placed beyond the point of danger. Prior accidents in question with the electric wires were notice
that at a certain place, the wires were not properly
maintained.
In Sargent v. Union Fuel Co., 3?' Utah 392, 108 Pac.
928 (Respondent's brief p. 41), there was a dangerous
condition in defendant's mine, because of failure to
timber or in some manner provide against the dangerous
condition thereof.
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In Osplind v. Pearce, 221 N. W. 6'79 (Respondent's
brief p. 41), the evidence admitted was to show previous
accidents caused by the same defect on a roller coaster,
and in Manson v. Mays Department Stores Co., '71 S. W.
(2) 1081 (Respondent's brief p. 41), the falling of plaster
was notice to the defendant that the plaster on the ceiling was loose and in a dangerous condition.
The testimony of Squires, besides being objectionable as hearsay, did not show any defect or condition
which defendant might or should have remedied, or show
any negligence of any employee which defendant might
have corrected. Respondent would not seriously contend
that if the defendant was being sued for the negligent
operation of an automobile that the fact defendant
had had a prior accident in the same automobile would
he admissible or have any probative value in proving
defendant was 11egligent in the second accident. The
situation would he different, however, in the accident
case, if the defendant had an accident because of a defect
in the steering gear, hut continued to drive the same
automobile without having such defect corrected, and
thereafter had another accident caused by the same defective gear. If a hank were robbed by a burglar getting
through a basement window, the hinges of which were
worn out, such would he notice to a hank to fix such defective window. On the other hand, if the only fact
known was the fact that the hank was robbed, there
would he no proof that the hank was negligent if it
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happened to be robbed again at a later date. As well
stated in Perera v. Panama-Pacific International E.vposition Co., 175 Pac. 454, the "prior theft is of no practical
importance in. this connection, in view of the want of evidence as to the circumstances thereof."
We submit, first, that the evidence of the prior theft
in the instant case was inadmissible as being based on
hearsay and because related to a wholly irrelevant and
collateral matter, there being nothing shown as to the
circumstances thereof, and nothing showing a defect or
condition that defendant might or should have remedied,
and, second, that at any rate, the matter was of no
practical importance in the case, except to prejudice the
trial court.
DAMAGES

Respondent has no answer to appellant's assignment of error No. 12 (Ab. 56). The court erred in permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint to increase the
amount of damages claimed, in view of the specific stipulation limiting the damages if plaintiff should recover,
to $715.00 in addition to the usual taxable costs.
We respectfully submit that the judgment In this
case should be reversed.
STEW ART, STEWART & PARKINSON
EDWIN B. CANNON
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant, Covey Garage
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